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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

EQUJTRADE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
and JAMES ALAN WEST,
Plaintiffs,

ClVJL ACTION FILE NO.
2017CV286507

V.

LEE ANNE BUSMAN,

Business Case Div. 4

Defendant.

FINAL ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CLOSING CASE

The above styled action 1s before the Court on Defendant Lee Alme Busman's
(Defendant "Busman?') Motion for Summary Judgment. Having considered the entire record and
argument of counsel at a March 15, 2019 hearing held in this matter, the Court finds as follows:
SUMMARY OFF ACTS
This case has a protracted and tortured history that stems from a 2013 business
transaction involving Plaintiff Equitrade International, Inc. ("EI") and its Chief Executive
Officer, James Alan West (Plaintiff "West"), on one side and Barter Consultants International,
lnc. ("BCI") and its former President/Chief Executive Officer, Defendant Busman, on the other.
That transaction has now spawned three lawsuits in this Court.'

It appears Defendant was formerly known as Lee Anne Busman but is now known as Lee Anne Hearn.
Because the pleadings and relevant documents for the most part refer to Defendant as Lee Anne Busman, she will be
referred lo herein as Defendant "Busman."
2
See also Eguitrade International. Inc. and James Alan West v. Lee Anne Busman. individually. Barter
Consultants International. Jnc .• and Lee Anne, Inc .. Superior Court of Fulton County, No. 20 l 3CY233445 ("2013
Action"); Eguitrade International. Inc. and James Alan West v. Lee Anne Busman. Superior Court of Fulton County,
No. 20 l 7CY289468("2017 Action for Injunctive Relief}

Defendant Busman's ex-husband-Bob Busman-started BCI in December 1999. As
described by Defendant, the company provided alternative currency which business owners
could use in running their companies by using what was termed BCl "Trade Dollars." Clients
would earn Trade Dollars by selling their goods and services and could spend Trade Dollars by
purchasing other active members' goods and services. Defendant and Bob Busman divorced in
201 l and pursuant to their divorce agreement Defendant was given tbe business. She became the
Chief Executive Officer of BCI in April 2011.
Altb.ough the parties differ in how they describe the transaction, sometime between 2012
and March 2013 El and BCI reached an agreement whereby BCI would "join" or merge with EI
in a new joint venture to be known as "Equitrade Atlanta" (the "2013 Merger Agreement").
According to Plaintiff. Equitrade Atlanta was to absorb the BCI members and EI would provide
management services to those members. However, disputes soon arose between the parties,
including allegations that, e.g., Defendant diverted Equitrade Atlanta funds to her personal use;
Defendant refused to allow Equitrade Atlanta to pay EI for U1e goods and services provided;
Plaintiffs locked Defendant out of the BCI/EI office and refused to allow her access to ber
personal office and belongings; and Plaintiffs learned there was a previously undisclosed tax lien
against BCJ that should have prevented the sale or transfer of any assets of BCI.
On July 3, 2013, Plaintiffs initiated the 2013 Action against Defendant Busman, BCI, and
Lee Anne, Inc. (an entity formed by Defendant to be the majority member of Equitrade Atlanta).

In that action Plaintiffs asserted claims against the named defendants for: breach of the 2013
Merger Agreement for failing to remit payment to EI for services rendered; fraud and
misrepresentation for purporting lo enter into the 2013 Merger Agreement when a tax lien
existed against BCT and an agent of BC1 had falsely reported to the Internal Revenue Service
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("IRS") that BCI was "defunct" and had no assets; conversion regarding Busman's diversion of
funds from Equitrade Atlanta; a claim for "bad faith"; a request for injunctive relief and a
protective order; quantum meruit; and attorney's fees.
The 2013 Action was originally assigned to the Honorable Constance C. Russell. The
parties appeared before Judge Russell on July 18, 2013 and announced that they had reached a
settlement agreement the terms of which were described in open court and transcribed in a
"Transcript of Settlement Agreement." At that proceeding, counsel for the parties" described the
settlement terms, Judge Russell made various inquiries regarding certain terms, and the parties
with counsel at various points conferred and then would address Judge Russell on the record. In
particular, there was considerable discussion regarding the outstanding debt owed to the IRS
described as the IRS "Trust Fund Debt", the exact amount of which was unknown at the time.
The parties/counsel discussed, e.g., what would happen if the debt was more than anticipated, if
they were not able to negotiate that debt down with the IRS, what was meant by the term "Trust
Fund Debt" and if that is a term of art understood by all of the parties. Judge Russell in particular
pressed the parties regarding the ta,'< issue and the patties/counsel's understanding of the term
"Trust Fund Debt":

The Court: Okay. My only question was, the term that they have used is
"Trust Fund Debt." Do you all have a shared understanding of what "Trust
Fund Debt" means so that if something happens that isn't quite what you
had in mind, we all know what "Trust Fund Debt" means? Does it have a
meaning in the J.R.S. Code or is it a term that you-all have come up with?
Does it have a shared meaning?

Mr. Gordon: It's LR.S. terminology, your honor, that they said has to be
paid in order for this debt to be satisfied.
3

Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. I (Transcript of Settlement Agreement Before
the Honorable Constance C. Russell, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, July 18, 2013; herein "Transcript of Settlement
Agreement").
4
Sims Gordon, Esq. appeared on behalf of El and West and Leighton B. Deming, Jr., Esq. appeared on
behalf of Busman, BC! and Lee Anne, Inc.
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The Court: All right. So, "Trust Fund Debt" has an understood meaning

in federal courls. If you're ever having a fight about what "Trust Fund
Debt" is, the l.R.S. can tell us what it is.
Mr. Gordon: Yeah, that's correct, Your Honor.
The Court: Mr. Deming, is that right? Do you have a shared
understanding as to what "Trust Fund Debt" means?
Mr. Deming: No. I'Il tell you why. I deal with the I.R.S. all the time. And
I have to deal here with any I.R.S. debt that's owed. Which is - - it is Trust
Fund, but that penalties and interest [sic]; they've agreed to sell it for

$38,500, fine.
The Court: They who has agreed?
Mr. Deming: The I.R.S.
The Court: Who - - Okay, the l.R.S. is not here.
Mr. Deming: I know.
The Court: So, you-all are assuming that the I.R.S. has said $38,500 and
that that is in fact going to work out; and it may very well, okay ....
Mr. Deming: Or Jess.
Mr. Gordon: Your honor, may I - - may I shed some light on it. You

know, J handle a big volume of bankruptcy cases, and so what we
generally do in those cases - - and this is why we feel like, you know, it
should be the Trust Fund Debt, your honor, because the Trust Fund Debt
cannot be wiped out We can wipe out the other debt. Right now B.C.l.
won't have any assets, so it means they can file bankruptcy and wipe it all
out.
The Court: Let me explain something to you.
Mr. Gordon: Yes, yes.
The Court: I'm not trying to resolve your settlement deal. I don't care
what your deal is.1 simply want you-all, when you walk out of here, to be
clear about what your deal is. So if you tell me that "Trust Fund Debt" has
a specific meaning and they don't agree that it means the same thing, you
don't have a shared understanding.
Mr. Gordon: Give me one second.

4

(The parties confer.)
Mr. Deming: They'll do it.
Mr. Gordon: Okay, thank you. I think we have a shared meaning.
Mr. Deming: That was correct, wasn't it?

Ms. Collier: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. You may keep reading.
Mr. Gordon: Thank you.
The Court: And just remember, Mr. West, Ms. Busman, if you don't
stand up, you live with what they say. Go ahead ... 5
At the conclusion of the proceeding Judge Russell noted the parties' agreement had been
read into the record and declared: "Based upon the representations of counsel and the affirmative
responses of the parties, it's accepted by the court."6 Although the parties were to "close" the
agreement by August 9, 2013, they ultimateJy failed to close the settlement.
On or about August 7. 2013, the IRS sent "Sims W. Gordon, Jr. Attorney for James Alan
West" a notice of the liens on BCI's tax debt.' According to the notice: "The amount owed on
the tax liabilities included on the notice(s) of federal tax lien filed against Barter Consullants
International is $140.676.80 computed to 09/05/2013."
On August 15, 2013, the 2013 Action was transferred to this Court. After additional
negotiations, on July 18, 2014, the parties reached a settlement and executed a Settlement
Agreement and General Mutual Release (the "Settlement Agreement")." Under the Settlement
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Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. I (Transcript of Settlement Agreement before
the Honorable Constance C. Russell, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, July 18, 2013; herein "Transcript of Settlement
Agreement") at pp. 7-9.
6
1.Q,_ at p. 15.
Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. 2 {IRS August 7, 2013 BCI Tax Notice).
8
Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. 3 (Settlement Agreement and General Mutual
Release).
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Agreement EI and/or West were to pay Busman, individually, $72,000.00 at a rate of $1,500.00
per month for 48 consecutive months in payments made payable to the Kevin T. Moore, P.C.
IOLTA Trust

Account." The parties also executed a Consent Judgment which could be filed with

the Court for entry upon submission of an affidavit from Busman's counsel of nonpayment and
default by El/West."
The Settlement Agreement included a provrsion specifically addressing the "Internal
Revenue Service Debt":

5. Internal Revenue Service Debt. There is an Internal Revenue Service
Trust Fund debt, which is owed. James West and/or Equitrade
International, Inc. have agreed and shall become responsible for and
assume the entire Trust Fund Debt and the charges directly associated
therewith owed to the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of Lee Anne
Busman and Barter Consultants International, Inc. and shall
indemnify and hold harmless Lee Anne Busman and Barter
Consultants International, Inc. for said debt so owed to the Internal
Revenue Service. Lee Anne Busman will execute any and all documents
needful and necessary to allow James West and Equitrade International,
Inc. to be abJe to speak with the f nternal Revenue Service to negotiate
and/or pay the owned amount to the Internal Revenue Service. James West
will notify and provide to Kevin T. Moore, Esq. evidence when all
amounts owed to the Internal Revenue Service are paid in full within five
business days of receipt of documentation evidencing foll satisfaction of
11
debt [sic].
The Settlement Agreement also included broad mutual releases of all cJaims:
3. Mutual Releases. For and in consideration of the monies to be paid and
mutual agreement to waive all past, present, and future claims the Parties
may have against each other related to the Superior Court litigation, the
parties do hereby, on behalf of themselves, their respective former and
current agents, attorneys, officers, managers, directors, employees,
associated companies, affiliated companies subsidiaries, sureties, and
successors and assigns, do hereby release and forever discharge the
other party(ies) named or described above from any and all lawsuits,
causes of action, claims, demands, costs, and obligations of any kind
9

Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (Ilk/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. 3 (Settlement Agreement and General Mutual
Release) at ,i I.
10
& at,i2.
11
& at ~5 (emphasis added).
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or nature whatsoever, both known and unknown, to person and property,
which have resulted in the past, which exist at present, or which may
in the future arise related to the Superior Court litigation and/or the
relationship among any of the Parties hereto as of the date of this
Agreement. THJS IS A FULL MUTUAL RELEASE AND SHALL BE
CONSTRUED AS BROADLY AS POSSIBLE TO CONSTITUTE A
FULL, FfNAL AND COMPLETE RELEASE OF THE RELEASED
PARTIES FROM ALL CLAIMS, DEMANDS, DAMAGES AND
CAUSES OF ACTION. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this release shall
not extend to any claims arising from a breach of this Agreement. 12
Beginning in August 2014, Busman received monthly payments of $1,500 per the
Settlement Agreement for IO months. Thereafter she did not receive any other payments.':'
Busman avers that West falsely informed the IRS that the $72,000 owed to her was in payment
for a customer list that had previously belonged to BC!. However, Busman alleges that assertion
was false as EI had possession and use of the customer list for at least three (3) years prior to the
parties' settlement." Nevertheless, as a result, it appears the IRS issued a Notice of Levy with
respect to BCJ to withhold all payments made by EI and/or West to the Law Firm of Kevin T.
Moore, P.C. on behalf of Lee Anne Busman.
Upon the failure of Plaintiffs to continue to make payments to Busman pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement, this Court ultimately entered the parties' Consent Judgment, granting
Busman a money judgement in the amount of $72,000 (minus payments previously made). The
Court also denied Plaintiffs' motions seeking to set aside that judgment, finding that under the
Settlement Agreement, EI and West were obligated to pay money to Busman, individually, and
to satisfy BCl's Trust Fund Debt on behalf of Busman and BCI.'5 The Court specifically found:
By submitting the payments due to [Busman] to the IRS in satisfaction of
the tax debt, Plaintiffs are not satisfying the letter or the spirit of the
12

Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (13/k/a Lee Anne Busman), Ex. 3 (Settlement Agreement and General Mutual
Release) at ~3 (capitalized emphasis in original; bold emphasis added).
13
Affidavit of Lee Anne Hearn (f/k/a Lee Anne Busman) at ~20.
14
Id. at ~21.
15
2013 Action, Order entered October I 0. 2016.
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Settlement Agreement. Instead they are using money owed to [Busman]
to satisfy the IRS debt that they also agreed to pay. West and Equitrade
cannot avoid their obligation to pay past due taxes on the Trust Fund Debt
by redirecting the $72,000 owed individually to [Busman] to the IRS.16
Separately, Busman initiated garnishment proceedings against Plaintiffs. Amid ongoing
disputes regarding whether Plaintiffs had satisfied their obligations under the Settlement
Agreement, including with respect to paying the IRS debt and the sums owed to Busman
personally, Plaintiffs initiated this action on February 24, 2017. They then filed the 2017 Action
for Injunctive Relief on May 2. 2017, seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction, and permanent injunction for injunctive relief prohibiting Busman "from engaging in
any further discovery and collection efforts against Plaintiffs, through garnishment, levy or
otherwise pending the foll adjudication of this cause."17
Plaintiffs concede that under the Settlement Agreement they agreed to pay the Trust Fund
Debt. Plaintiffs assert they did so but. upon receipt of a formal Notice of Levy directing them to
remit to the IRS aJI payments due to Defendant Busman, they thereafter directed their payments
to the IRS as directed. 18 Plaintiffs also contend that they have satisfied the Trust Fund Debt in
full. Specifically, Plaintiffs requested confirmation from the IRS of the amount due solely under
the Trust Fund Debt and received written confirmation

OJ1

June 9, 2015 that the outstanding Trust

Fund Debt was $15,754.77.19 Plaintiffs assert they thereafter engaged in investigations that
revealed a number of both state liabilities (Georgia Department of Revenue and Georgia
Department of Labor) and federal tax liabilities.

16

2013 Action, Order entered October I 0, 2016, p. 7.
See 2017 Action for Injunctive Relief, Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order. Preliminary Injunction,
and Permanent Injunction, p. 2. The 2017 Action for Injunctive Relief was transferred to this Court on September
29, 2017. The Court denied Plaintiffs' requests for injunctive relief on December 5, 20 I 7 and ultimately dismissed
the action on November I 6, 2018.
18
Verified Complaint, Ex. C (Notice of Levy).
19
Verified Complaint, Ex. D (IRS letter dated June 9, 2015 from L. Jones, Revenue Officer). The Court notes
that the letter states "the total of the trust fund recovery penalty today is$ I 5,754.77" (emphasis added).
17
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Of the federal liabilities, allegedly $3,233.00 are for 1120 taxes (income tax liabilities);
$352.18 are for 940 taxes (unemployment tax liabilities); together resulting in 6721 civil
penalties of over $54,000. Plaintiffs allege these liabilities and the Georgia Department of
Revenue and Department of Labor liabilities were not disclosed at any time and that Defendant
claimed that her taxes were current. According to Plaintiffs:
Tbe June 9, 2015 correspondence, balance of payments remitted to the
IRS in satisfaction of the Levy Notices, and total Liens and FfF As
outstanding upon BCI and Defendant make it clear that the Levy Notices
served upon Plaintiffs are not for the Trust f und debt, but for other
unrelated federal income tax, state income tax and Department of Labor
liabilities.
The unrelated federal income tax, state income tax and Department of
Labor liabilities not comprising the Trust Fund debt (a) have been in
existence since prior to the purported sale by Defendant of the assets of
BCI and liabilities of Defendant and BCI to EI; (b) have been known by
Defendant since prior to the purported sale by Defendant of the assets of
BCI and liabilities of Defendant and BCI to EI; and (c) relate to debts of
Defendant and imposed upon the assets of BCJ acquired from Defendant,
all of which Defendant knowingly, purposefully and fervently withheld.20
Plaintiffs also alleges Busman had actual notice of each of the I iens and FIF As in existence since
prior to the filing of the 2013 Action. creation of the July 18, 2013 Transcript of Settlement
Agreement before Judge Russell, and negotiations that resulted in the Settlement Agreement.
In this action, Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendant Busman for: (1) fraud in the
factum; (2) fraud in the inducement; and (3) unjust enrichment. Defendant Busman, in tum,
asserts counterclaims against EI and West, alleging they are attempting to avoid collection of the
sums owed to Busman by filing this lawsuit related to U1e same dispute and tax issues addressed
in the 20 I 3 Action. Busman asserts claims against El and West for: (I) fraud and
misrepresentation; (2) conversion/trover; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) punitive damages; and (5)
"stubborn litigiousness" (seeking attorney's fees and costs under O.C.G.A. §13-6-11).
20

Consolidated Pre-Trial Order. i]6 (Plaintiffs' outline of the case and contentions) alp. 7.
9

ANALYSIS
I.

DEFENDANTS' MOTJON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard on Summary Judgment
Summary judgment should be granted only when the rnovant shows "that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."

O.C.G.A. § 9-J 1-56(c).

"A defendant may do this by showing the court that the

documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no
evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiffs case."
Scarbrough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829,830.525 S.E.2d 377,378 (1999) (quoting Lau's Corp.
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491,491.405 S.E.2d 474, 475-76 (1991). To avoid summary judgment, "an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere al legations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [O.C.G.A. §9-11-56), must set forth specific facts
showing tbat there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. §9-1 l-56(e).
"[A]t the summary judgment stage, courts are required to construe the evidence most
favorably towards the nonmoving party, who is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
possible inferences." Smith v. Tenet Health Sys. SpaJding. Inc., 327 Ga. App. 878, 879, 761
S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). See Word v. Henderson, 220 Ga.
846, 848, 142 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1965) ("Where the evidence on motion for summary judgment is
ambiguous or doubtful. the party opposing the motion must be given tbe benefit of all reasonable
doubts and of all favorable inferences and such evidence construed most favorably to the
opposing party opposing the motion"). However, "[m]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility
[are] insufficient to preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011)
(quoting Rosales v. Davis, 260 Ga. App. 709, 712, 580 S.E.2d 662,665 (2003)).
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B. Conclusions of Law
Defendant Busman has moved for summary judgment with respect to all claims asserted
against her. The Court is compelled to note that Defendant filed her Motion for Summary
Judgment on September 17, 2018. On October 10, 2018, Plaintiff El filed a Notice of Request for
Mediation. On October 24, 2018, EI filed Plaintiff Equitrade International, [oc.'s Response and
Reservation of Right to File Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

In that filing El includes its "Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment" but does not include citations to the record other than generally
incorporating by reference Defendant Busman's entire deposition.
In the foregoing filing EI argues Defendant's motion should be denied because: factual
questions exist regarding "the extent to which Defendant's acts may be deemed to be Fraud in
the Factum and/or Fraud in the inducement and result in Unjust Enrichment to Defendant"; and
there is evidence of "Defendant's actual knowledge of tax liabilities of BCI not disclosed to
Plaintiffs prior to the formation of Equitrade Atlanta, prior to the initial Trial Transcript
Settlement Agreement, prior to the formation of Equitrade Atlanta [sic], prior to the settlement
reduced to Transcript, the Settlement Agreement [sic], and prior to Defendant's acts of
garnishment.t'[' El's filing also includes a "Request for Accommodation" (requesting an
accommodation in the late filing of tbe response citing an injury suffered by Plaintiff's counsel
on September 26 2018 and counsel's belief the response had been timely filed by office staff)
and a "Request to Reserve Right to File Brief' whereby EI purports to reserve its right to file a

11

Plaintiff Equitrade International. lnc.'s Response and Reservation of Right to File Brief in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. p. 5.
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brief in support of its response "unless this Court requests otherwise." However, no supplemental
response has been submi tted by EI.
Plaintiff James Alan West, who according lo the parties' Consolidated Pre-Trial Order is
appearing in this matter

pro se, did not file any response to Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment and be did not appear at the March 15, 20 l 9 hearing. See Rapps v. Cooke, 234 Ga.
App. 131, 131-32, 505 S.E.2d 566,568 (1998) ("A failure to respond to a motion for summary
judgment results in waiver of the right to present evidence in opposition to the motion, but the
moving party must still show from the pleadings and the evidence that summary judgment is
appropriate"); Fowler v. Smith, 237 Ga. App. 841,842.516 S.E.2d 845,847 (1999) (same).
At the request of and with the consent of all parties, the Court deferred consideration of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on multiple occasions to allow the parties an
opportunity to privately mediate their dispute and to obtain necessary tax documents from the
IRS to inform their settlement discussions. See, e.g., Scheduling Order entered November 16,
2018; Amended Scheduling Order entered December 14, 20 I 8; and Order Continuing and
Resetting Summary Judgment Hearing entered on March 4, 2019. In short, the parties have been
afforded ample opportunity to pursue mediation, to attempt to negotiate a settlement of their
dispute, to obtain necessary information with respect to their claims and defenses, and to address
the pending Motion for Summary Judgment.

J. Fraud claims
Fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement are species of fraud. Specifically, fraud
in the factum is "the sort of fraud that procures a party's signature to an instrument without
knowledge of its true nature or contents." Bellamy v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 266 Ga. 630, 631,
469 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1996) (citation omitted). See, e.g, Straus v. Renasant Bank, 326 Ga. App.

12

271, 275, 756 S.E.2d 340, 344 (2014) (where lender brought action against borro wer aod
personal guarantors to collect unpaid loan, finding the guarantors' claim of fraud in the factum
was not supported because the evidence showed they knew they were signing a guaranty such
that they could not contend their signature was procured without knowledge of the true nature of
the document they were signing).
"To establish a claim for fraud in the inducement, or inceptive fraud to enter into a
contract, a plaintiff must prove both that the defendant failed to perform a promised act and that
the defendant bad no intention of performing when the promise was made." Nash v. Roberts
Ridge Funding, LLC. 305 Ga. App. 113, 116-17, 699 S.E.2d 100, 102 (2010) (citing Cowart v.
Gay, 223 Ga. 635, 636-637(1): 157 S.E.2d 466 (1967)). "Evidence showing nothing more than
the parties' disagreement regarding the interpretation of a contract's terms is inadequate to
support an inceptive fraud claim." Nash, 305 Ga. App. at 117 (citations omitted).
As explained by the Court of Appeals of Georgia:
[T]he test of the defense of fraud in the factum is that of excusable
ignorance of the contents of the writing signed. The party must not only
have been in ignorance, but must also have had no reasonable opportunity
to obtain knowledge. The primary difference between these two types of
fraud [i.e. fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement] lies in the
parties' understanding of the contract into which they are entering. lf a
party understands the nature of the contract [it is] executing but contends
that there has been some material misrepresentation as to the obligations
[a]rising thereunder, only a fraud in the inducement claim will lie.

Straus, 326 Ga. App. at 275 (quoting Bank of the Ozarks v. Khan, 903 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1378(1ll)
(N.D.Ga.2012)).
Importantly, "[i]n order to prove fraud, the plaintiff must establish five elements: (I) a
false representation by a defendant, (2) scienter, (3) intention to induce the plaintiff to act or

refrain from acting, (4) justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and (5) damage to plaintiff." Engelman v.
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Kessler, 340 Ga. App. 239, 246, 797 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2017) (citing Suo Nurseries. Inc. v. Lake
Erma. LLC, 316 Ga.App. 832, 835 (1 ), 730 S.E.2d 556 (2012)).
As to the element of justifiable reliance, it is not sufficient to show that
false representations were knowingly made with an intent to deceivethere must also be proof that due care was exercised to discover the fraud.
Charter Med. Mirmt. Co. v. Ware Manor. Inc .. 159 Ga.App. 378, 380, 283
S.E.2d 330 (1981 ). "Misrepresentations are not actionable unless the
complaining party was justified in relying thereon in the exercise of
common prudence and diligence." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
at 383,283 S.E.2d 330. Moreover, a party is not justified in relying on and
assuming to be true representations consisting of mere expressions of
opinion, hope, expectation, puffing, and the like; rather, representations of
this nature must be inquired into and examined to ascertain the truth. Id.;
Wilkinson v. Walker, 143 Ga.App. 838,839,240 S.E.2d 210 (I 977).
Todd v. Martinez Paint & Body. Inc., 238 Ga. App. 128, 128-29, 517 S.E.2d 844,846 (1999).
Here, with respect to the fraud in the factum claim, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs
signed or otherwise entered into any agreement "without knowledge of its true nature or
contents." Moreover, the record and protracted nature of the parties' settlement negotiations from
2013 plainJy belie any assertion by Plaintiffs that they had no reasonable opportunity to obtain
knowledge regarding the agreements they were entering into. To the extent Plaintiffs claim some
fraud, misunderstanding or misrepresentation regarding the nature or contents of the 2013
Merger Agreement, any claims arising thereunder were mutually released under the parties'
Settlement Agreement.
Further, to the extent Plaintiffs claim some fraud, misunderstanding or misrepresentation
regarding the nature or contents of the executed Settlement Agreement, including what taxes
were in dispute and what taxes constituted the "Trust Fund Debt" to be paid by Plaintiffs, again
the record belies this contention. As noted above, the parties with the full benefit of counsel had
an extensive discussion among themselves and with Judge Russell at the July 1.8, 2013
proceeding about the tax issues relevant to the parties' dispute. Thus, they were plainly on notice
14

of those issues which were ultimately addressed in the Settlement Agreement executed a year
later on July 18, 2014. Moreover, there is record evidence that on or about August 7, 2013
(before the written Settlement Agreement was executed) the IRS sent Plaintiffs' counsel a notice
indicating that as of September 5, 2013 "[t]he amount owed on the tax liabilities included on the
notice(s) of federal tax lien filed against" BCI were $140,676.80. Thus, Plaintiffs were well
aware of the federal liens against BCI before they executed the Settlement Agreement in 2014.
Additionally, to succeed on either fraud claim, Plaintiffs must show justifiable reliance,
i.e. "there must also be proof that due care was exercised to discover the fraud." Todd, 238 Ga.
App. at 128-29. In light of the protracted discussions and negotiations surrounding the tax
liabilities at issue, admissions during the July 18, 2013 proceeding before Judge Russell that the
parties were not sure of the exact amount that was owed, and the August 7, 2013 notice provided
by the IRS, it is plainly clear that Plaintiffs were on notice of the tax issues. Plaintiffs, thus, had
an obligation to exercise due care before settling their claims and ultimately agreeing to "become
responsible for and assume the entire Trust Fund Debt and the charges directly associated
therewith owed to the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of Lee Ann [isc] Busman and Barter
Consultants International, Inc."
Having failed to do so, Plaintiffs' fraud claims fail as a matter of law and the parties are
bound by their executed Settlement Agreement. Notably, under the Settlement Agreement
Plaintiffs not only expressly "agreed to be responsible for and assume the entire Trust Fund Debt
and the charges directly associated therewith owed to the [lRS] on behalf of [Defendant] and
[BCI]," they also expressly agreed to "indemnify and hold harmless [Defendant] and [BCI] for
said debt so owed to the [IRS]." These undisputed facts undercut Plaintiffs' theories of recovery
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entirely. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the fraud in the factum and fraud in
the inducement claims is hereby GRANTED.

2. Unjust Enrichment
"[U]njust enrichment applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal contract ... but
where tbe party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an
unjust enrichment which the benefited party equitably ought to return or compensate for."
Engram v. Engram, 265 Ga. 804,806,463 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1995) (quoting Smith v. McClung, 215
Ga. App. 786, 789(3), 452 S.E.2cl 229 ( 1994)).
"The theory of unjust enrichment is basically an equitable doctrine that the
benefitted party equitably ought to either return or compensate for the
conferred benefits when there was no legal contract to pay." (Citations
omitted.) Hollifield v. Monte Vista Biblical Gardens, 251 Ga.App. 124,
l 30(2)(c), 553 S.E.2d 662 (2001 ). "The concept of unjust enrichment in
law is premised upon the principle that a party cannot induce, accept, or
encourage another to furnish or render something of value to such party
and avoid payment for the value received." (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) ld. at 131(2)(c), 553 S.E.2d 662. For unjust enrichment to apply,
"the party conferring the labor and things of value must act with the
expectation that the other will be responsible for the cost." Id. Otherwise,
that party, like one who volunteers to pay the debt of another, has no right
to an equitable recovery. Id.
Morris v. Britt, 275 Ga. App. 293, 294, 620 S.E.2d 422, 424 (2005). "[A] claim for unjust
enrichment is not a tort, but an alternative theory of recovery if a contract claim fails." Wachovia
Ins. Servs .. Inc. v. Fallon, 299 Ga. App. 440, 449, 682 S.E.2d 657, 665 (2009) (quoting Tidilcis v.
Network for Med., etc., 274 Ga. App. 807. 811(2), 619 S.E.2d 481 (2005)). Thus, ·'[a]n unjust
enrichment theory does not lie where there is an express contract." Donchi. Inc. v. Robdol. LLC,
283 Ga. App. 161,167,640 S.E.2d 719, 724 (2007) (quoting Pryor v. CCEC. lnc., 257 Ga.App.
450, 452(4), 571 S.E.2d 454 (2002)).
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Here, Plaintiffs allege the following constitutes an unjust enrichment to Defendant
Busman: "[r]eceipt of the payments due under the Settlement Agreement while receiving the
benefit of payments of the same amount to the IRS for and on behalf of Defendant"; [r]eceipt of
the funds by Defendants for the sale of BCI's assets when the assets are subject to multiple liens
which liens have resulted in levies being satisfied by Plaintiffs"; and "[r]eceipt by Defendant of
funds through garnishment and other collection efforts bypassing the IRS liens and levy being
satisfied by Plaintiffs."?
However, the money to be paid to Busman personally and the separate "Internal Revenue
Service Debt" assumed by EI/West are express provisions of the parties' written Settlement
Agreement. As such, as a matter of law a claim for unjust enrichment will not lie for disputes
arising thereunder. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the
unjust enrichment claim is GRANTED.

II.

DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS
As noted above, in this action Busman asserts counterclaims against EI and West for:

(1) fraud and misrepresentation; (2) conversion/trover; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) punitive
damages; and (5) "stubborn litigiousness" (seeking attorney's fees and costs under O.C.G.A.

§ 13-6-11 ). As discussed at the March 15, 2019 hearing and as agreed by all parties/counsel
present at the hearing, the foregoing claims are duplicative and/or seek duplicative relief as has
already been awarded to Busman under the Consent Judgment that was issued in the 2013
Action. As such, the Court hereby DISMISSES Defendant's counterclaims.
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Verified Complaint,~~ 69-71.
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CONCLUSION
Having considered the entire record and given all of the above: Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED; and Defendant's counterclaims are DTSMlSSED without
objection by Defendant. Insofar as there are no remaining claims for adjudication in this action,
this constitutes a FINAL ORDER in this matter and the Clerk of the Court is directed to mark
this case CLOSED.
SO ORDERED this

-1.!Z._ day of March, 2019.
J. ' GER, S NIOR JUDGE
ulton County Superior Court
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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